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FROM THE GREAT DEPRESSION TO THE GREAT 
RECESSION:  
ON THE FAILURE OF REGULATION IN THE MORTGAGE 
MARKET 
Dov Solomon* 
People tend to attribute the outbreak of the 2008 financial crisis to deregulation. 
This article challenges this view and presents a unique perspective of the crisis as in 
fact rooted in the way the residential mortgage market is regulated. Focusing on non-
recourse mortgage legislation, which is a unique feature of the US mortgage market 
dating back to the period following the Great Depression, the article analyzes the 
contribution of this legislation to the onset of the Great Recession. The discussion 
shows how regulation that was enacted in response to a major economic crisis not 
only failed to prevent a large-scale future crisis but also created the conditions for 
its eventual emergence. 
Non-recourse laws prevent lenders from seeking a deficiency judgment after 
foreclosure and impose no personal liability on borrowers in the event of default. 
They distort risk allocation in the mortgage market as they allow borrowers to exter-
nalize the risk of default to third parties. These laws thus create incentives for exces-
sive borrowing, which ultimately resulted in the housing boom and bust of the 2000s. 
The analysis in this article has important implications for current reforms in leading 
foreclosure states, such as California and Nevada, where regulators recently ex-
panded the scope of the existing mandatory non-recourse legislation. The insights 
from the article regarding non-recourse mortgages should serve as a warning to reg-
ulators against adopting such legislation. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The 2008 global financial crisis, triggered by the mortgage meltdown in the 
United States, offers surprising insight into the regulation of the mortgage market. 
Contrary to the common view that the crisis was rooted in deregulation,1 this article 
 
         *    Assistant Professor, College of Law and Business, Ramat Gan Law School. PhD, MBA & LLB, Bar-
Ilan University. I would like to thank the participants in the Commercial Law Workshop at the College of Law 
and Business for helpful comments. I am grateful to Derora Tropp for excellent research assistance. 
 1.  For example, President Obama blamed deregulation for causing the 2008 financial crisis. THE WHITE 
HOUSE, REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT ON THE ECONOMY, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-of-
fice/2012/06/14/remarks-president-economy-cleveland-oh (last updated June 14, 2012):  
Without strong enough regulations, families were enticed, and sometimes tricked, into buying homes 
they couldn’t afford.  Banks and investors were allowed to package and sell risky mortgages.  Huge, 
reckless bets were made with other people’s money on the line. And too many from Wall Street to 
Washington simply looked the other way. 
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argues that it was in fact the way the market was regulated in response to the Great 
Depression that created the conditions for the Great Recession. The article expands 
on this historical perspective through an in-depth examination of the legislation re-
lating to non-recourse mortgages, which was enacted following the Great Depression. 
This analysis reveals the central role played by the non-recourse legislation in the 
housing boom and bust of the 2000s and concludes with some important insights on 
regulation in general and regulation of the mortgage market in particular. 
Non-recourse loans are a unique characteristic of the US mortgage market2 and 
first emerged in state legislation in the 1930s. A decrease in demand for real estate 
and the ensuing precipitous drop in prices during the Great Depression led to the 
realization of mortgages at minimal prices, significantly below their outstanding bal-
ances. As a result, not only did borrowers lose the roofs over their heads to lenders 
but also faced lawsuits by the same lenders for the significant remainder of their debt. 
This harsh reality caused many states to adopt borrower-friendly legislation.3 Specif-
ically, these laws limited the lender’s recourse, prohibiting him from suing the bor-
rower personally for the difference between the foreclosure sale price and the out-
standing balance of the debt.4 The legislation thus essentially imposed a non-recourse 
arrangement on the parties to the mortgage transaction.5 In effect it gave the borrower 
a put option, allowing her to terminate the remainder of the debt in exchange for 
transferring the mortgaged property to the lender.6 
In the 1990s, the effect of this lack of personal liability for borrowers in a non-
recourse mortgage was compounded by the relaxation of credit standards. Unlike the 
traditional requirement for a minimum down payment of 20% of the collateralized 
property’s total value, loan-to-value (LTV) ratios grew in the years preceding the 
mortgage crisis.7 Lenders’ willingness to give loans to borrowers without a signifi-
cant down payment is commonly attributed to the expansion of the securitization 
market, which allowed lenders to transfer the risks associated with default to third 
parties.8 Furthermore, in many cases, homebuyers could avoid investing personal 
 
See also Catherine Rampell, Lax Oversight Caused Crisis, Bernanke Says, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2010), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/04/business/economy/04fed.html (“Regulatory failure, not low 
interest rates, was responsible for the housing bubble and subsequent financial crisis of the last decade.”). 
 2.  See The Economic Stimulus and Sustained Economic Growth: Hearing Before the H. Democratic 
Steering & Policy Comm., 111th Cong. 3 (2009) (statement of Martin Feldstein), available at 
http://www.nber.org/feldstein/EconomicStimulusandEconomicGrowthStatement.html (“[M]ortgages loans are 
generally non-recourse loans . . . This ‘no recourse’ character of mortgages is unique to the United States.”). 
 3.  See Michael H. Schill, An Economic Analysis of Mortgagor Protection Laws, 77 VA. L. REV. 489 
(1991) (analyzing borrower-friendly legislation). 
 4.  GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 8.3 (5th ed. 2007). 
 5.  James B. Hughes, Jr., Taking Personal Responsibility: A Different View of Mortgage Anti-Deficiency 
and Redemption Statutes, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 117, 124 n.41 (1997). 
 6.  An option is a legal right granted by one party to the other to buy or sell something at a fixed price 
and within a specified period. An option that grants the right to buy is called a call option, while an option that 
grants the right to sell is called a put option. 
 7.  See Joshua Rosner, Housing in the New Millennium: A Home Without Equity Is Just a Rental with 
Debt (2001), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1162456. 
 8.  See, e.g., Legislative and Regulatory Options for Minimizing and Mitigating Mortgage Foreclosures: 
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. 74 (2007) (statement of Ben Bernanke, US Federal 
Reserve Chairman); see also Benjamin J. Keys et al., Did Securitization Lead to Lax Screening? Evidence from 
Subprime Loans (EFA 2008 Athens Meetings Paper, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1093137; Luc 
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funds by taking credit insurance for housing loans with high LTV ratios9 or second 
mortgages.10 Indeed, data on the US mortgage market show that on the eve of the 
mortgage crisis, approximately half of all borrowers had not been required to put 
down any money before receiving their housing loans.11 
States that have since adopted non-recourse mortgage legislation, such as Cali-
fornia and Arizona, were at the center of the outbreak of the mortgage meltdown.12 
Non-recourse loans combined with no down payment requirement created a distor-
tion of risk allocation in the mortgage market. The lack of an ex-ante requirement to 
invest personal equity upfront and an ex-post requirement holding the borrower per-
sonally responsible for repayment created a moral hazard.13 It incentivized borrowers 
to take out loans regardless of whether they would be able to repay them, fully aware 
that they were externalizing the risk of default to third parties.14 Thus, the availability 
of full financing alongside no personal obligation for repayment led to excessive bor-
rowing and the resulting real estate bubble.15 
When the real estate market crashed, however, this bubble burst and the value of 
the collateralized assets plummeted to below the value of the balance of the mort-
gages.16 Since equity in an asset is defined as the surplus of value over debt, this 
 
A. Laeven et al., Credit Booms and Lending Standards: Evidence from the Subprime Mortgage Market 1 (IMF 
Working Paper No. 08/106, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1153728; Atif R. Mian & Amir Sufi, 
The Consequences of Mortgage Credit Expansion: Evidence from the U.S. Mortgage Default Crisis (2008), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1072304. 
 9.  Credit insurance policies for housing loans with LTV ratios greater than 80% are supplied both by 
federal assistance frameworks (for eligible parties) and by the private sector. Insurance will be triggered in the 
event of foreclosure and protects the lender from losses due to a decline in the value of the collateralized prop-
erty. 
 10.  Second mortgages are given at higher interest rates since they reflect the risks resulting from allowing 
financing beyond the traditional threshold of 80% and that the lien in favor of the second lender is subordinate 
to the first lender. In popular parlance, these second mortgages are known as “piggybacks.” 
 11.  See infra notes 96-98 and accompanying text. 
 12.  See Arizona, California Markets Lead Top Ten List for Home Sales, UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL 
(Oct. 27, 2009, 10:45 AM), http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Real-Estate/2009/10/27/Arizona-California-
Markets-Lead-Top-Ten-List-for-Home-Sales/3731256654866/. 
 13.  Situations in which the party that creates the risk stands to gain but does not bear the potential loss are 
referred to as a moral hazard. See generally Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 
237 (1996); CAROL A. HEIMER, REACTIVE RISK AND RATIONAL ACTION, MANAGING MORAL HAZARD IN IN-
SURANCE CONTRACTS (1985). 
 14.  John Harding, Thomas J. Micelli & C.F. Sirmans, Do Owners Take Better Care of Their Housing 
Than Renters?, 28 REAL ESTATE ECON. 663 (2000); Ankoor Jain & Cally Jordan, Diversity and Resilience: 
Lessons from the Financial Crisis, 32 U.N.S.W.L.J. 416, 440 (2009); Schill, supra note 3, at 534. 
 15.  See Christopher J. Mayer et al., The Rise in Mortgage Defaults 23 (Fed. Reserve Bd., Fin. & Econ. 
Discussion Series, Paper No. 2008-59, 2008), available at http://www.federalre-
serve.gov/pubs/FEDS/2008/200859/200859pap.pdf (arguing that as the standards for granting loans relaxed, 
the availability of loans for housing purchases increased along with the demand for housing and housing prices); 
Andrey D. Pavlov & Susan M. Wachter, Underpriced Lending and Real Estate Markets (2006), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=980298 (arguing that the accessibility of loans to borrowers increased the demand for 
housing and that this caused housing prices to rise more steeply than the real value of the assets). 
 16.  Housing prices rose at a yearly average of 11% between 2000 and 2005. Following a brief period of 
stability, the prices began to drop at an average rate of 10% from mid-2006 to mid-2008. Mayer et al., supra 
note 15, at 21. 
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created a negative equity situation.17 When the negative equity was significant, ra-
tional borrowers preferred to stop repaying their loans, walk away from their homes, 
and be freed of their debt.18 This was possible because the loans were non-recourse 
mortgages. Known as strategic default, this phenomenon characterized the US real 
estate market during the mortgage meltdown.in March Guiso et al. found that  19 
2009, 26.4% of defaults on mortgages were strategic, and by September 2010, this 
figure had risen to 35.1%.20 The massive abandonment of property had a snowball 
effect, leading to rapidly deteriorating prices in the market and further escalating the 
meltdown.21 
Analyzing the non-recourse mortgage model and its contribution to the outbreak 
of the mortgage crisis is crucial for understanding the risks of the recent regulatory 
reforms in the US mortgage market in leading foreclosure states, such as California 
and Nevada.22 Following the mortgage meltdown, state regulators in these states ex-
panded the scope of their mandatory non-recourse legislation.23 The insights from 
the analysis of the incentive distortions created by non-recourse legislation and its 
long-term costs should serve to warn state regulators against adopting such legisla-
tion. 
The discussion proceeds as follows: Part II identifies the inherent flaws of hasty 
regulatory responses to economic crises. Part III then presents the non-recourse 
model adopted by certain states in the US following the Great Depression to contend 
 
 17.  Negative equity situation is often referred to colloquially as being “underwater,” as the level of out-
standing debt is conceived of as a kind of “waterline” and the market value of the property as the height it 
attains. 
 18.  The growing phenomenon of borrowers who leave their homes when the value of the asset is less than 
the balance of the debt has been the subject of extensive media coverage. See, e.g., Nicole Gelinas, The Rise of 
the Mortgage “Walkers,” WALL ST. J., Feb. 8, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/arti-
cle/SB120243369715152501.html?mod=rss_Today’s_Most_Popular; Barbara Kiviat, Walking Away From 
Your Mortgage, TIME, June 19, 2008, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1816472,00.html; 
Ruth Simon & James R. Hagerty, One in Four Borrowers Is Underwater, WALL ST. J., Nov. 24, 2009, 
http://online.wsj.com/article_email/SB125903489722661849-lMyQjAxMDI5NTI5NDAyMzQ0Wj.html; Da-
vid Streitfeld, When Debtors Decide to Default, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2009, http://www.ny-
times.com/2009/07/26/weekinreview/26streitfeld.html. 
 19.  See Brent T. White, Take This House and Shove It: The Emotional Drivers of Strategic Default, 63 
SMU. L. REV. 1279 (2010) (interviewing more than 350 individuals who, by their own admission, have either 
already strategically defaulted on their mortgages or are considering doing so in an attempt to map the reasons 
for strategic defaults). 
 20.  Luigi Guiso et al., The Determinants of Attitudes toward Strategic Default on Mortgages, 68 J. FIN. 
1473, 1490 (2013). 
 21.  It is important to note that the wide scope of default was not necessarily connected solely with sub-
prime mortgages—that is, high-interest-rate loans sold to riskier borrowers—and in fact characterized the entire 
US mortgage market. See Stan Liebowitz, New Evidence on the Foreclosure Crisis: Zero Money Down, Not 
Subprime Loans, Led to the Mortgage Meltdown, WALL ST. J.,  July 3, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/arti-
cle/SB124657539489189043.html (“[T]he focus on subprimes ignores the widely available industry facts (re-
ported by the Mortgage Bankers Association) that 51% of all foreclosed homes had prime loans, not subprime, 
and that the foreclosure rate for prime loans grew by 488% compared to a growth rate of 200% for subprime 
foreclosures.”). 
 22.  See, e.g., 2012 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 64 (S.B. 1069 amending CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 580b); NEV. 
REV. STAT. § 40.455 (2009); NEV. REV. STAT. § 40.458 (2011). 
 23.  Following the mortgage crisis, California, which considered a non-recourse state even before the cri-
sis, expanded the protection to borrowers further, whereas Nevada shifted directly from a recourse regime to a 
non-recourse regime. See infra Part VII. 
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with the massive home foreclosures during that period. Part IV analyzes the unique 
risk allocation with non-recourse loans, which is directly impacted by fluctuations in 
the market price of the asset serving as collateral. This allocation of the risk creates 
an ex-ante incentive for excessive borrowing and an ex-post incentive for strategic 
default when there is negative equity in the property. Part V analyzes the trend of 
lenient down payment requirements for housing loans that characterized the US mort-
gage market in the years leading up to the mortgage meltdown and considers the 
central role of securitization in this process. Part VI explains how non-recourse loans 
combined with no down payment requirements in the mortgage market contributed 
to the housing boom and bust. In Part VII, recent regulatory reforms broadening the 
scope of non-recourse mortgages are analyzed. Part VIII concludes the article and 
points to the lessons that can be learned from its analysis. 
 
II. REGULATION IN THE WAKE OF CRISIS 
In times of economic crisis, regulatory agencies tend to respond with swift and 
extensive reform.24 Their goal is to quell the public outrage and rebuild trust in the 
regulatory agencies and stability of the markets. This is seen as essential for halting 
escalation of the crisis at hand and preventing similar crises in the future. A cynical 
view of this recurring pattern would be that this is directed more at creating the im-
pression of a serious response than at actually yielding such a response. The focus, it 
could be said, is on the positive short-term impact rather than on positive long-term 
changes.25 
A prominent example of this pattern of rapid regulation was the response to fi-
nancial scandals exposed in US corporations between the end of the 1990s and be-
ginning of the 2000s. In late 2001, the energy giant Enron, the seventh largest com-
pany in the US at the time, suddenly collapsed.26 This was the result of the exposure 
of complex accounting fraud, misrepresentation of earnings, and deliberate omission 
of liabilities from the company’s balance sheet. When Enron became insolvent, thou-
sands of employees lost their jobs. In addition, investors in the capital markets suf-
fered immense damage from the collapse of Enron and other corporations, such as 
Worldcom, in which financial irregularities were discovered.27 Regulatory agencies 
wasted no time in taking action to restore investor confidence. The 2002 Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (“SOX”) was passed with the aim of strengthening supervision and inter-
nal control over financial reporting of public companies.28 President George W. Bush 
 
 24.  Stuart Banner, What Causes New Securities Regulation? 300 Years of Evidence, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 
849, 850 (1997) (“[M]ost of the major instances of new securities regulation in the past three hundred years of 
English and American history have come right after crashes.”); Joseph A. Grundfest, Punctuated Equilibria in 
the Evolution of United States Securities Regulation, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 1 (2002); Frank Partnoy, Why 
Markets Crash and What Law Can Do About It, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 741, 743 & n.11 (2000). 
 25.  P.N. Grabosky, Counterproductive Regulation, 23 INT’L J. SOC. L. 347, 356 (1995). 
 26.  LOREN FOX, ENRON: THE RISE AND FALL (2003). 
 27.  For a description of the worst financial scandals exposed in the US at the end of the second millennium 
and beginning of the third, see A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (And 
It Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915, 923-36 (2003). 
 28.  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 
 
2016] Journal of Legislation  167 
called SOX “the most far-reaching reforms of American business practices since the 
time of Franklin Delano Roosevelt” and the New Deal.29 
A second recent instance of hurried regulatory response was the action taken to 
contend with the global financial crisis of 2008. This crisis, which had originated in 
the US mortgage market, snowballed and spread into many other markets, in part 
because of mortgage securitization and active trade in mortgage-backed securities 
(MBSs).30 Again, regulatory agencies took rapid steps to calm the public uproar and 
restore confidence in the stability of the markets. In July 2010, Congress passed the 
Dodd-Frank Act, designed to enforce comprehensive financial reform in public com-
panies.31 
This pattern of hasty regulatory activity raises the concern that legislation is 
passed without sufficient scrutiny. The risk is that there is not enough time to take 
into account all of the factors that caused the crisis in question and to evaluate alter-
native possible measures for dealing effectively with them.32 Moreover, following 
any financial crisis, regulatory agencies face harsh media criticism and intense public 
pressure to come up with solutions. This could lead to the enactment of legislation 
whose main purpose is to calm public anger, even though it may not be the most 
appropriate measure for addressing the economic exigencies.33 Pressure to pass leg-
islation that will prevent future crises can lead to an overestimation of the benefits 
and underestimation of the costs of the new measure.34 
The legislative initiatives that followed financial crises have been harshly criti-
cized in the academic literature. Roberta Romano, for example, calls the SOX re-
forms ineffective quack corporate governance.35 She contends that most of the cor-
porate governance rules introduced by SOX were not new initiatives designed to deal 
 
18, 28, 29 U.S.C.). 
 29.  Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Signs Bill Aimed at Fraud in Corporations, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2002, at 
C5, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/31/business/corporate-conduct-the-president-bush-signs-bill-aimed-at-
fraud-in-corporations.html. 
 30.  For the central role played by securitization of mortgages in the financial crisis, see, e.g., John D. 
Martin, A Primer on the Role of Securitization in the Credit Market Crisis of 2007, in LESSONS FROM THE 
FINANCIAL CRISIS: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND OUR ECONOMIC FUTURE 199 (Robert W. Kolb ed., 2010); 
TIMOTHY F. GEITHNER, FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNSEL, MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS OF RISK RETEN-
TION REQUIREMENTS 10-14 (2011), available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/wsr/Documents/Sec-
tion%20946%20Risk%20Retention%20Study%20%20(FINAL).pdf; Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Securit-
ization, in 2A THE HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE 1 (George Constantinides et al. eds., 2012); 
Dov Solomon, The Rise of a Giant: Securitization and the Global Financial Crisis, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 859 (2012). 
 31.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 
(2010). 
 32.  Saule T. Omarova & Adam Feibelman, Risks, Rules, and Institutions: A Process for Reforming Fi-
nancial Regulation, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 881, 884-85 (2009); Roberta Romano, Regulating in the Dark, in 
REGULATORY BREAKDOWN: THE CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE IN U.S. REGULATION 86 (C. Coglianese ed., 2012). 
 33.  Luca Enriques, Regulators’ Response to the Current Crisis and the Upcoming Reregulation of Finan-
cial Markets: One Reluctant Regulator’s View, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1147, 1149-50 (2009); Romano, supra note 
32, at 88-89. 
 34.  Enriques, supra note 33, at 1152-53; Larry E. Ribstein, Bubble Laws, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 77, 79-80 
(2003). 
 35.  Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 
YALE L.J. 1521 (2005). 
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with the failures of the Enron and Worldcom affairs but merely recycled and repack-
aged “off the shelf” ideas with no clear connection to the financial crisis at hand.36 
Congress’s desire to do something to contend with the public outrage led lawmakers 
to throw together an assortment of controversial ideas and pass them into law. Suffi-
cient consideration was not given to the contents of the proposed legislation, its con-
nection to the causes of the financial predicaments, and its potential long-term impact 
on the financial environment.37 
Similar criticism was leveled against the reforms in the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act, 
and the analogy to “quack remedies” resurfaced. Stephen Bainbridge identifies a 
number of different features of this type of hasty regulatory measure, including the 
following: the regulation is passed in response to a financial crisis; its central purpose 
is to defuse public criticism of corporations and/or the markets; it is generally not 
based on new proposals but on longstanding policy that is being advanced by power-
ful interest groups; and the empirical evidence cited in support of the regulation is, at 
best, mixed.38 
The incentive to swiftly enact legislation following a financial crisis is clear: it 
is essential for signaling to the public that the regulatory authorities are taking the 
severity of the crisis seriously and are acting promptly and decisively to remedy the 
situation. The importance of restoring investor confidence in the stability of financial 
markets should not be underestimated. The short-term benefit of immediate action—
i.e., restoration of investor confidence—is likely to be more significant than the long-
term damage that could be caused by ill-advised legislation. Theoretically, the short-
term advantages of positive signaling through swift legislation outweigh the potential 
long-term disadvantages, which can be mitigated by more measured and prudent leg-
islation in the future. 
Given this potential for long-term damage, Romano suggests that a sunset pro-
vision be included in the legislation to limit its force to a certain time period unless 
Congress decides to extend it.39 The reauthorization process would allow time for 
gathering relevant information that might not have originally been available, for care-
ful examination of the causes of the crisis and the implications of the legislation, and 
for a retroactive evaluation of the legislation’s efficacy. This would make it easier for 
Congress to correct any defects in the legislation and prevent long-term damage from 
laws enacted quickly and under pressure. The automatic expiration of the law after a 
 
 36.  Id. at 1523. See also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Sarbanes-Oxley: Legislating in Haste, Repenting in Lei-
sure, 2 CORP. GOVERNANCE L. REV. 69, 70 (2006) (arguing that the SOX reforms were a compilation of ideas 
thrown together by regulators and hastily enacted by Congress in order to divert the anger of investors in the 
wake of the financial scandals). 
 37.  Romano, supra note 35, at 1525-29. But see Robert A. Prentice & David B. Spence, Sarbanes-Oxley 
as Quack Corporate Governance: How Wise Is the Received Wisdom?, 95 GEO. L.J. 1843 (2007) (defending 
the SOX reforms and rejecting Romano’s criticism). 
 38.  Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance Part II, 95 MINN. L. 
REV. 1779, 1795-96 (2011). 
 39.  Romano, supra note 32, at 95-103; Romano, supra note 35, at 1599-1602. The biggest critic of the 
proposal to include a subset provision is John Coffee. John C. Coffee, The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: 
Why Financial Reform Tends to Be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1019 
(2012). For Romano’s response to this criticism, see Roberta Romano, Regulating in the Dark and a Postscript 
Assessment of the Iron Law of Financial Regulation, 43 HOFSTRA L. REV. 25 (2014). 
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certain period should ease the burden of repealing flawed legislation and counteract 
the natural tendency to reaffirm the status quo. The main disadvantage of Romano’s 
proposal, however, is that such a provision would also dilute the signaling power of 
the law as to the seriousness of the regulatory response to the crisis.40 The knowledge 
that the legislation will expire unless reapproved will raise doubts as to the authori-
ties’ long-term commitment to the regulatory process; it could be perceived as an 
attempt to mislead the public in the short-term and simply “wait out the storm.” Such 
a clause would thus undermine the goal of restoring investor confidence and reduce 
the short-term benefits of the legislation.41 
Some scholars have also observed that regulation following a crisis is often ac-
tually an attempt to address the problems of the past,42 focusing on past failures rather 
than preparing for the challenges of the future. This article takes one step further by 
arguing that not only does such regulation fail to meet future needs, it can even sow 
the seeds of future crises. It looks back at how, historically, regulation that was 
adopted pursuant to a major economic crisis not only failed to prevent a large-scale 
crisis in the future but also created the conditions for its emergence. The discussion 
analyzes legislation relating to non-recourse mortgages that was enacted in response 
to the housing crisis of the Great Depression, pointing to its central contribution to 
bringing on the mortgage crisis of the Great Recession. 
III. NON-RECOURSE LEGISLATION 
Housing purchases tend to be one of the biggest transactions of a person’s life. 
The high purchase price of a home usually means that the buyer must obtain external 
credit to finance the transaction. To secure the repayment of the loan, the buyer-bor-
rower uses the house she intends to buy as collateral in favor of the financer-lender. 
The mortgage is meant to ensure that if the borrower cannot repay the loan, the lender 
can foreclose on the property, turn the borrower out, and sell the property. The 
amount collected from the sale of the house will then be used to recover the outstand-
ing balance of the debt. 
Non-recourse mortgages are secured only by the mortgaged property, with the 
borrower bearing no personal liability for repayment of the loan. Though personal 
liability was a fundamental component of classic common law mortgages,43 modern 
legal systems allow for the option of mortgages with no personal liability for borrow-
ers.44 In the absence of such liability, the lender’s only remedy in the event of default 
 
 40.  Romano herself identifies two other flaws in the proposal to include a sunset provision: the lack of 
flexibility in determining the timetable for evaluating and reapproving the legislation and the increasing of the 
burden on Congress. Romano, supra note 35, at 1600. 
 41.  Luca Enriques & Dirk Zetzsche, Quack Corporate Governance, Round III? Bank Board Regulation 
Under the New European Capital Requirement Directive, 16 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 211, 242 (2015). 
 42.  See, e.g., JOHN G. FRANCIS, THE POLITICS OF REGULATION: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 182 
(1993) (comparing the actions of the regulator to the actions of a military commander after losing a battle, in 
that both focus on past failures rather than preparing for future challenges); Ribstein, supra note 34, at 78; 
Romano, supra note 32, at 87. 
 43.  GEORGE E. OSBORNE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES 156-57 (2d ed. 1970). 
 44.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 1.1 (1997) (“A mortgage is enforceable 
whether or not any person is personally liable for that performance.”); Nelson & Whitman, supra note 4, § 2.1. 
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is foreclosure. Even if the foreclosure sale price returns only a portion of the unpaid 
debt, the lender is not able to seek a deficiency judgment against the borrower to 
recover the outstanding balance from unsecured assets or future income. Moreover, 
this lack of personal liability holds regardless of whether the borrower has the finan-
cial wherewithal to continue her monthly mortgage payments. 
State legislation from the 1930s intended to protect borrowers is the historical 
source of non-recourse mortgages. During the Great Depression, many borrowers 
were unable to keep to the monthly repayment schedule on their mortgages. This 
caused lenders to foreclose on the mortgaged properties and evict the borrowers from 
their homes. The problem, however, was that in many cases, the foreclosure yielded 
a significantly lower return than the outstanding balance of the debt, for three princi-
pal reasons. First, by its very nature as a forced sell at a given point in time, a fore-
closure commonly fails to garner the fair market value for the foreclosed real estate.45 
Second, during the Great Depression, housing prices fell dramatically even in regular, 
non-foreclosure sales on the free market. And third, the shrinking housing financing 
market during the Great Depression severely restricted the availability of credit, 
which, in turn, significantly reduced the number of housing purchases and led to a 
further decline in real estate prices.46 
In the majority of cases, the lenders themselves would purchase the mortgaged 
property at a minimal price during the foreclosure process.47 They would then imme-
 
 45.  BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 539 (1994). See also Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whit-
man, Reforming Foreclosure: The Uniform Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act, 53 DUKE L.J. 1399, 1417-18 (2004). 
 46.  Hughes, supra note 5, at 125-26. 
 47.  In many cases, the lender is the only party offering to buy the property in foreclosure. Moreover, even 
in cases where there are other offers, the lender enjoys distinct advantages over other bidders. See Grant S. 
Nelson, The Impact of Mortgagor Bankruptcy on the Real Estate Mortgagee: Current Problems and Some Sug-
gested Solutions, 50 MO. L. REV. 217 (1985): 
Frequently, the mortgagee is not only the foreclosure sale purchaser, but the only bidder attending 
the sale. There are several reasons for this phenomenon. First, because the mortgagee can bid up to 
the amount of the mortgage debt without putting up new cash, he has a distinct bidding advantage 
over a third party bidder, who will have out-of-pocket expense from the first dollar bid. Second, 
while foreclosure statutes require notice by publication to potential third party bidders, the notice, 
especially in urban areas, is published in legal newspapers of limited circulation. Moreover, because 
the publication is technical in nature, a potential third party purchaser has little idea what real estate 
is being sold. Third, many potential third party purchasers are reluctant to buy land at a foreclosure 
sale because of the difficulty of ascertaining if a purchaser will receive good and marketable title. 
Fourth, when a mortgagee forecloses on improved real estate, potential bidders often find it difficult 
to inspect the premises prior to sale. While it may be in the self-interest of the mortgagor to allow 
third party inspection of the premises, mortgagors who are about to lose their real estate through a 
foreclosure sale understandably are reluctant to cooperate. 
See also Prentiss Cox, Foreclosure Reform Amid Mortgage Lending Turmoil: A Public Purpose Ap-
proach, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 683, 701 (2008). Empirical research shows that in many cases, the lender in fact 
acquires the property in foreclosure. See, e.g., Debra Pogrund Stark, Facing the Facts: An Empirical Study of 
the Fairness and Efficiency of Foreclosures and a Proposal for Reform, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 639, 663 
(1997) (“In most cases, the only people present at the foreclosure sale are the lender, the borrower, and the party 
conducting the foreclosure sale. Third parties successfully bid in only 11.2% of the 1993 judicial sales cases 
and only 9.6% of the 1994 judicial sales cases.”); Steven Wechsler, Through the Looking Glass: Foreclosure 
by Sale as De Facto Strict Foreclosure: An Empirical Study of Mortgage Foreclosure and Subsequent Resale, 
70 CORNELL L. REV. 850, 875 (1985) (“In the sample of 118 foreclosure sales, the mortgagee bid successfully 
in 91 cases, or seventy-seven percent of the total, and third parties bought in 27 cases, or twenty-three percent 
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diately seek deficiency judgments against the borrowers for the large difference be-
tween the low foreclosure proceeds and the outstanding balance of the debt.48 If the 
lender then sold the property for more than the foreclosure price, he realized windfall 
profits. This situation benefited lenders since they obtained the mortgaged assets at a 
minimal price and could continue to pursue claims against borrowers for the balance 
of the debt and even profit. Borrowers, in contrast, not only lost their homes but were 
also sued for the full amount of the debt.49 These dismal conditions for borrowers 
prompted states to enact borrower-friendly legislation that would prevent lenders 
from continuing to pursue borrowers for the remainder of the debt after foreclosure.50 
The legislation prevented lenders from pursuing borrowers’ non-collateralized prop-
erty and future incomes. It limited the scope of the lender’s remedy to the borrower’s 
collateralized assets and precluded suing the borrower personally for the full amount 
of the debt.51 This anti-deficiency judgment legislation effectively forced the parties 
to the transaction into non-recourse mortgages. 
Given the complexity of the anti-deficiency judgment legislation and the diver-
gences between the various state laws, there is no consensus as to just how many US 
states have adopted non-recourse legislation. The accepted estimate, however, is 
around fifteen states,52 and a number of Canadian provinces have similarly adopted 
non-recourse legislation.53 Despite the many variances, state anti-deficiency judg-
ment laws can nonetheless be divided into four main categories:54 (1) laws prohibit-
ing any deficiency under a loan secured by residential real estate; (2) laws prohibiting 
any deficiency when the mortgage or deed of trust is “purchase money;” (3) laws 
 
of the total.”). 
 48.  The value of the secured claim includes the principle, interest earned, and the foreclosure expenses. 
11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (2006) (“To the extent that an allowed secured claim is secured by property the value of 
which, after any recovery under subsection (c) of this section, is greater than the amount of such claim, there 
shall be allowed to the holder of such claim, interest on such claim, and any reasonable fees, costs, or charges 
provided for under the agreement or State statute under which such claim arose.”); 11 U.S.C. § 506(c) (2006) 
(“The trustee may recover from property securing an allowed secured claim the reasonable, necessary costs and 
expenses of preserving, or disposing of, such property to the extent of any benefit to the holder of such claim, 
including the payment of all ad valorem property taxes with respect to the property.”). 
 49.  Hughes, supra note 5, at 126. 
 50.  Nelson & Whitman, supra note 4. 
 51.  Todd J. Zywicki & Joseph D. Adamson, The Law and Economics of Subprime Lending, 80 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 1, 30-31 (2009). 
 52.  Id. at 30 n.134 (estimating that around 15-20 states adopted non-recourse legislation, including some 
of the largest states); Andra C. Ghent & Marianna Kudlyak, Recourse and Residential Mortgage Default: Evi-
dence from US States, 24 REV. OF FIN. STUD. 3139, 3143 (2011) (categorizing eleven states as having adopted 
non-recourse legislation); Ron Harris & Asher Meir, Non-Recourse Mortgages—A Fresh Start, 21 AM. BANKR. 
INST. L. REV. 119, 120 (2013) (estimating that between ten to fifteen states have adopted non-recourse legisla-
tion); Oren Bar-Gill, The Law, Economics and Psychology of Subprime Mortgage Contracts, 94 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1073, 1113 (2009); CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, OCTOBER OVERSIGHT REPORT: AN ASSESSMENT OF FORE-
CLOSURE MITIGATION EFFORTS AFTER SIX MONTHS 157-58 (2009), available at http://cy-
bercemetery.unt.edu/archive/cop/20110402043235/http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-100909-report.pdf 
[hereinafter OCTOBER OVERSIGHT REPORT]. For a compilation of state laws related to foreclosure, see United 
States Foreclosure Laws, http://www.foreclosurelaw.org/. 
 53.  Lawrence D. Jones, Deficiency Judgments and the Exercise of the Default Option in Home Mortgage 
Loans, 36 J.L. & ECON. 115, 117 (1993). 
 54.  See 2 MICHAEL T. MADISON ET AL., THE LAW OF REAL ESTATE FINANCING §§ 12:69-12:73 (rev. ed. 
2015). A number of states have adopted more than one type of anti-deficiency judgment laws. 
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prohibiting the recovery of any deficiency following a nonjudicial foreclosure by 
power of sale;55 and (4) laws limiting the deficiency to the difference between the 
loan balance owing and either the foreclosure sale price or the fair market value of 
the property, whichever is greater. The last category of laws effectively denies re-
course when the fair market value of the property is higher than the balance of the 
debt, even if the amount received upon foreclosure is less than the loan balance.56 
In Honeyman v. Jacobs57 and Gelfert v. National City Bank,58 the Supreme Court 
confirmed state authority to interfere in mortgages through non-recourse legislation. 
Many scholars and policymakers, however, have criticized the implications of such 
legislation,59 arguing that it passes on high costs to borrowers, without them deriving 
any significant benefit from this.60 
IV. RISK ALLOCATION IN NON-RECOURSE MORTGAGES 
The risk allocation between the parties in a non-recourse mortgage is directly 
affected by fluctuations in the market price of the collateralized asset. When real es-
tate prices rise and the value of the property becomes greater than the balance of the 
mortgage, it is in the borrower’s interest to continue payment on the loan. However, 
when real estate prices drop and the value of the property falls below the balance of 
the debt, it is in the borrower’s interest to stop payment, walk away from the house 
and rent another one,61 send the keys to the collateralized property to the lender, and 
force the conclusion of the debt. In such cases of negative equity, strategic default is 
an attractive option for a borrower, even if she is able to afford the monthly mortgage 
 
 55.  The rationale for not allowing the lender recovery of any deficiency following a nonjudicial foreclo-
sure is that the lender’s choice of a nonjudicial process denied the borrower certain protections, such as redemp-
tion rights, that accompany judicial foreclosure. 
 56.  Hughes, supra note 5, at 125. 
 57.  306 U.S. 539, 543 (1939). 
 58.  313 U.S. 221, 231 (1941). 
 59.  See, for example, the remarks of Congressman Jeb Hensarling, OCTOBER OVERSIGHT REPORT, supra 
note 52, at 157: “[H]omeowners have become aware of the economic implications arising from applicable ‘anti-
deficiency’ and ‘single-action’ laws and other rules adopted in many states that permit, if not indirectly encour-
age, homeowners to avoid their contractual mortgage obligations.” 
 60.  See, e.g., Mark Meador, The Effects of Mortgage Laws on Home Mortgage Rates, 34 J. ECON. & BUS. 
143, 146 (1982) (finding that anti-deficiency judgment laws raise interest rates on loans backed by newly built 
homes by 13.87 basis points and for existing homes by 22.65 basis points); SUSAN E. WOODWARD, U.S. DEP’T 
OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV. A STUDY OF CLOSING COSTS FOR FHA MORTGAGES 50-52 (2008), available at 
http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/FHA_closing_cost.pdf (finding that anti-deficiency judgment laws 
raise costs to borrowers by $550 per $100,000 of loan amount); Brent W. Ambrose & Anthony B. Sanders, 
Legal Restrictions in Personal Loan Markets, 30 J. REAL ESTATE FIN. & ECON. 133, 149 (2005) (finding that 
borrowers in states with non-recourse legislation pay higher credit costs on high LTV mortgages by about 33 
basis points). But see Schill, supra note 3. 
 61.  Theoretically, a borrower may prefer to buy a new house rather than rent. However, walking away 
from her current home and defaulting on the mortgage payments will affect her credit score, and it will be 
difficult for her to obtain a new loan. If the borrower wants to buy a new house, she must get a new mortgage 
before defaulting on the current mortgage and damaging her credit score. Therefore, in most cases, the borrower 
will be inclined to rent a different house rather than buy a new one. See Adam J. Levitin, Resolving the Fore-
closure Crisis: Modification of Mortgages in Bankruptcy, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 565, 640, 655 n.265. 
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payments.62 
This risk allocation between the parties can be described as a put option the 
lender gives to the borrower. The option allows the borrower to stop repayment of 
the mortgage and eliminate the outstanding debt in exchange for transferring the col-
lateralized property to the lender.63 By exercising this option, the borrower essentially 
sells the property to the lender for the price of the balance of the debt. Applying the 
model of options to non-recourse mortgages predicts that strategic default by the bor-
rower will occur when the option is “in the money,” i.e., when there is negative equity 
in the property.64 
Although negative equity creates a strong incentive for strategic default, other 
factors, economic and otherwise, can influence a borrower’s decision.65 When the 
property is the borrower’s place of residence, she will incur transitional costs, includ-
ing the difficulties of renting or buying a new home, moving expenses, the costs of 
changing schools, and loss of communal and social ties (assuming the new home is 
not in the same vicinity as the former home).66 Defaulting on a loan will also become 
part of the borrower’s credit history, which will hurt her credit rating67 and make it 
difficult for her to obtain credit in the future.68 In addition, moral considerations 
might influence the borrower’s decision.69 Defaulting on a loan is perceived by some 
as immoral and irresponsible70 and to be avoided even if doing so incurs significant 
 
 62.  See, e.g., John M. Quigley & Robert Van Order, Explicit Tests of Contingent Claims Models of Mort-
gage Default, 11 J. REAL ESTATE FIN. & ECON. 99, 106 (1995) (indicating that negative equity is strongly as-
sociated with higher default rates); Levitin, supra note 61, at 639-40 (arguing that in the case of non-recourse 
mortgages, walking away is an attractive option for a homeowner with negative equity who can find a better 
rental deal elsewhere). 
 63.  A different way of terminating the mortgage early is by prepayment, i.e., when the loan is paid in full 
prior to maturity. This can be viewed as a call option that allows the borrower to buy back the remaining mort-
gage payments from the lender at the prevailing mortgage rate. For a review of the literature on mortgage ter-
mination risk, see Michael LaCour-Little, Review Articles: Mortgage Termination Risk: A Review of the Recent 
Literature, 16 J. REAL ESTATE LITERATURE 297 (2008). 
 64.  Yongheng Deng et al., Mortgage Terminations, Heterogeneity and the Exercise of Mortgage Options, 
68 ECONOMETRICA 275, 284 (2000). 
 65.  Levitin, supra note 61, at 638. 
 66.  In addition to these costs, there are the unique qualities of the current home. Many people remodel 
their homes to fit their needs. Therefore, walking away from one’s home also involves the loss of the specific 
compatibility of that house with one’s needs. See Guiso et al., supra note 20, at 1480. 
 67.  Foreclosure can cause an immediate drop in the borrower’s credit rating by 140-150 points on the 
Vantage scale and appear as a mark in the credit bureau records for up to seven years. Kenneth R. Harney, The 
Nation’s Housing: Credit Score Conundrums, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 2009, available at http://www.washing-
tonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/10/AR2009091004532.html. 
 68.  However, White estimates that the larger the scale of the negative equity, the more significant the 
borrower’s savings in strategic default relative to the damage to her credit rating. Brent T. White, Underwater 
and Not Walking Away: Shame, Fear and the Social Management of the Housing Crisis, 45 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 971, 983-85 (2010). Furthermore, given the high incidence of insolvency during the financial crisis, future 
lenders may attribute less significance to default during the crisis than they would to default in a period of 
prosperity. See Zywicki & Adamson, supra note 51, at 32. 
 69.  For a broad discussion of the morality of strategic default, see White, supra note 19; White, supra note 
68; Curtis Bridgeman, The Morality of Jingle Mail: Moral Myths About Strategic Default, 46 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 123 (2011); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Breaching the Mortgage Contract: The Behavioral Economics of Stra-
tegic Default, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1547 (2011). 
 70.  See, for example, Henry M. Paulson Jr., U.S. Sec’y of  the Treasury, U.S. Housing and Mortgage 
Market Update, Address Before the National Association of Business Economists (Mar. 3 2008), available at 
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costs.71 Moreover, there is the negative social stigma attached to strategic default; 
thus even borrowers with no particular moral qualms may be willing to put aside their 
own economic interests and continue payment to avoid the social costs.72 
Given these mitigating factors, the likelihood of strategic default is lower when 
there is a low level of negative equity in the asset, and vice versa: the greater the 
negative equity in the property, the greater the incentive to default on the mortgage. 
This is supported by the empirical evidence of a strong correlation between the level 
of negative equity and the propensity of borrowers to default. Guiso et al. found that 
when negative equity in the property was 10% of the value of the house, only 7.4% 
of borrowers wanted to stop repayment of the mortgage, whereas when negative eq-
uity increased to 40%-50%, the willingness to default rose to 12.4%.73 Moreover, not 
only did the relative value matter, but the absolute value of the negative equity was 
significant as well. Per given relative value of an equity shortfall, roughly 7% more 
households were willing to default when the shortfall was $100,000 as opposed to 
$50,000.74 Tirupattur et al. also found that at low levels of negative equity, strategic 
default rates are also relatively low, but pick up steadily as the level of negative equity 
rises.75 In conclusion, the propensity for default clearly increases as the proportion of 
negative equity in the property and its absolute value grow. 
Risk allocation is significantly different in cases where recourse is an option.76 
With recourse mortgage, a lender who wants to be repaid is not limited to the collat-
 
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp856.aspx. (“[L]et me emphasize, any home-
owner who can afford his mortgage payment but chooses to walk away from an underwater property is simply 
a speculator—and one who is not honoring his obligations.”). See also Fox Business: Some Homeowners Who 
Can’t Pay Choosing to Just Walk Away (Fox Business television broadcast Feb. 19, 2009), available at 
http://www.foxbusiness.com/video/index.html?playerId=videolandingpage&streamingFormat=FLASH&re-
ferralObject=3644995&referralPlaylistId=1292d14d0e3afdcf0b31500afefb92724c08f046: 
Seems obscene. Everyone else in the country is trying to pay their mortgages and trying to get things 
done. They realize in many cases they are underwater that their mortgage is worth more than their 
home. If you have obnoxious kids, walk away from your kids. Seems weird. Doesn’t it? . . . I know 
you are not looking at the ethics of this; you are a good and savvy businessman. Do you find it even 
a tinge offensive that we are moving away from personal responsibility? If we can’t hack it we bail 
out of it . . .  And you know when you enter into an agreement and everyone just throws up the keys 
and says you know it’s really tough this month, it’s gonna be tough next month, declining real estate 
values, we are just going to quit. Can you imagine if we all did that going into World War II? The 
Japanese just kicked our butts at Pearl Harbor, the odds are overwhelming, the Germans have just 
taken over Europe, and we just quit. What would happen if we all quit? Let’s just cease and desist. 
In contrast, White argues that strategic default should not be portrayed in a negative light, because mort-
gage arrangement allows the borrower to stop payment on the debt and send the keys to the lender. White, supra 
note 68. 
 71.  Guiso et al., supra note 20, at 1481. 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id. at 1483. 
 74.  Id. at 1483-84. 
 75.  Vishwanath Tirupattur et al., ABS Market Insights: Understanding Strategic Defaults, MORGAN STAN-
LEY 5 (Apr. 29, 2010), available at http://www.transunion.com/docs/rev/business/financialservices/FS_Mor-
ganStanleyStrategicDefaultResearch.pdf. 
 76.  Most countries in the world allow lenders a right of recourse to the borrower. See Harris & Meir, supra 
note 52, at 128-29 (arguing that recourse loans are common practice in most countries, including Japan, Aus-
tralia, Israel, and European countries); see references in id. n.49. 
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eralized property; he may also pursue repayment from any of the borrower’s uncol-
lateralized property or future incomes.77 Since the borrower bears personal liability 
for repayment of the debt, walking away from the mortgaged property is not a useful 
strategy even if its value drops below the balance of the debt. This would not termi-
nate the debt, as the borrower would be liable to repay the entire balance from her 
other assets and future incomes. 
Empirical studies confirm the premise that default rates in “recourse” states are 
significantly lower than the rates in “non-recourse” states. Demiroglu et al. compared 
default rates in states with and without anti-deficiency laws and found that borrowers 
with negative equity are significantly more likely to default in non-recourse states.78 
Ghent & Kudlyak found that on average, borrowers in non-recourse states are 32% 
more likely to default than borrowers in recourse states.79 Tirupattur et al. similarly 
found that the strategic default rate in California, a non-recourse state, is much higher 
than the strategic default rate in Florida, a recourse state.80 The difference between 
recourse and non-recourse jurisdictions has been examined in Canada as well. Jones 
analyzed data from the Canadian provinces of Alberta, which does not allow for re-
course, and British Columbia, which does, and found that strategic defaults are more 
likely to occur in Alberta.81 
A possible explanation for the lower default rates in recourse states is the deter-
rent effect of the lender’s ability to seek a deficiency judgment against the borrower 
to recover the outstanding balance from non-collateralized assets and future incomes. 
Ghent & Kudlyak analyzed the deterrent effect of recourse on residential mortgage 
default and found that its magnitude closely correlates with the borrower’s wealth: it 
increases with borrowers who have more assets to protect.82 Bhutta et al. also exam-
ined the deterrent effect of recourse on borrowers. They found that the median bor-
rower in Nevada and Florida (recourse states) defaults when she is 20 to 30 percent-
age points more underwater than the median borrower in California and Arizona 
(non-recourse states).83 These findings suggest that in recourse states, borrowers fac-
tor into the costs of default the potential personal liability that comes with foreclo-
sure. 
The difference between recourse and non-recourse states, however, is mitigated 
to some extent by the fact that, even in recourse states, borrowers might not neces-
sarily be exposed to the risk that lenders will seek deficiency judgments against them. 
Certain government agencies, such as the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), 
have adopted official or informal policies of refraining from bringing personal claims 
 
 77.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 8.2 (1997). 
 78.  Cem Demiroglu et al., State Foreclosure Laws and the Incidence of Mortgage Default, 57 J.L. & 
ECON. 225 (2014). 
 79.  Ghent & Kudlyak, supra note 52, at 3153. 
 80.  Tirupattur et al., supra note 75, at 3. 
 81.  Jones, supra note 53, at 127-29. 
 82.  Ghent & Kudlyak, supra note 52, at 3159-62. 
 83.  Neil Bhutta et al., The Depth of Negative Equity and Mortgage Default Provisions 25 (Bd. of Gover-
nors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Working Paper No. 2010-35, 2010), available at http://www.federalre-
serve.gov/pubs/feds/2010/201035/201035pap.pdf. 
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against borrowers.84 In addition, given that suing defaulting borrowers requires a 
substantial time and money investment, deficiency judgments are rare, even in the 
private sector.85 This is especially apparent in states where lenders are overburdened 
with foreclosures.86 Moreover, the potential of personal claims is further limited by 
the borrower’s resources. Particularly in cases where little or no down payment was 
made as a result of insufficient assets, borrowers may be judgment-proof and simply 
lack the property with which to repay their debt.87 Therefore, in a cost-benefit anal-
ysis, pursuing defaulting borrowers may prove to be not worthwhile, making the 
mortgages in question de facto non-recourse loans, even in recourse jurisdictions.88 
V. RELAXING DOWN PAYMENT REQUIREMENTS 
Homebuyers were traditionally required to invest a significant amount of their 
own to obtain a loan for the purchase of a home. Lenders in the US required at least 
20% of the total value of the home to be put down by borrowers so as to reduce 
risks.89 This created an “equity cushion” that covered the costs of foreclosure and 
protected against potential losses from declining real estate prices. Particularly cru-
cial for non-recourse mortgages: down payments reduced the likelihood of reaching 
a state of negative equity in the property, thereby preventing mortgages from being 
“in the money” and making strategic default less likely.90 
In the 1990s, however, there was a significant easing of down payment require-
ments.91 Lenders began offering loans with high loan-to-value (LTV) ratios that 
would allow homebuyers to obtain financing for the full amount of their purchases.92 
 
 84.  See John Mixon, Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Home Mortgage Documents Interpreted as Nonrecourse 
Debt (with Poetic Comments Lifted from Carl Sandburg), 45 CAL. W. L. REV. 35, 39-40 (2008); Jones, supra 
note 53, at 118; Ghent & Kudlyak, supra note 52, at 3141. 
 85.  Debra Pogrund Stark, Foreclosing on the American Dream: An Evaluation of State and Federal Fore-
closure Laws, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 229, 244 (1998) (“Lenders brought a deficiency action within one year after 
the foreclosure sale in approximately six to seven percent of the foreclosure sale cases.”); Wechsler, supra note 
47, at 878 (“[O]f the ninety-four studied cases in which the foreclosure sale left a deficiency amount, the mort-
gagee obtained a deficiency judgment in only one case, and in that case the judgment was not satisfied”); Vikas 
Bajaj, Mortgage Holders Find It Hard to Walk Away from Their Homes, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2008, at C1, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/10/business/10housing.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1. 
 86.  White, supra note 68, at 985. 
 87.  Zywicki & Adamson, supra note 51, at 30. 
 88.  Grant S. Nelson & Gabriel D. Serbulea, Strategic Defaulters Versus the Federal Taxpayer: A Brief for 
the Preemption of State Anti-Deficiency Law for Residential Mortgages, 61 ARK. L. REV. 65, 72 (2013); Bar-
Gill, supra note 52, at 1113; Harris & Meir, supra note 52, at 126. 
 89.  Bar-Gill, supra note 52, at 1076. 
 90.  White, supra note 68, at 1008. 
 91.  See Rosner, supra note 7, at 7-8 (describing the relaxation of credit standards in the 1990s, including 
the drastic reduction of minimum down payment levels from 20% to zero). 
 92.  The relaxing of down payment requirements made homeownership accessible to a population that, in 
the past, was only able to rent. Indeed, homeownership rates in the US increased as the requirements for getting 
mortgages eased up. According to the FDIC, homeownership in 2005 stood at 68.9% compared with 63.9% two 
decades earlier. Greg Griffin et al., No Money Down: A High-Risk Gamble, DENVER POST, Sept. 17, 2006, 
http://www.denverpost.com/ci_4347686. See also U.S. Census Bureau, Housing Vacancies and Homeowner-
ship: Historical Tables, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/historic/index.html (compilation of 
data on homeownership in the US from 1965 to today). 
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Although studies had indicated a correlation between high LTV ratios and the prob-
ability of reaching a state of negative equity and default,93 over the years, lenders 
increasingly declined to insist on down payments.94 
No-money-down mortgages became popular in the early 2000s. In many cases, 
borrowers could avoid putting down any money upfront by taking out credit insur-
ance for housing loans with high LTV ratios or second mortgages.95 The median96 
LTV ratio in the subprime market, including first and second mortgages, rose from 
90% in 2003 to 100% during 2005-2007.97 Furthermore, between August 2004 and 
July 2005, more than 40% of first-time homebuyers obtained loans with no down 
payment requirement.98 These data show that in the period leading up to the mortgage 
meltdown, about half of the housing loans had no down payment requirement. 
This relaxation of down payment requirements led to an increase in the number 
of borrowers, the value of the properties being purchased, and the proportion of 
monthly income allotted for mortgage repayment. Borrowers who were unable to 
furnish the traditional 20% down payment were still able to obtain mortgages and 
purchase homes. Some borrowers were able to purchase homes that were more ex-
pensive than those for which they could afford the 20% down payment. As a result 
of the increase in the value of the houses and the level of financing, monthly mortgage 
payments accounted for a higher percentage of borrowers’ household expenditures.99 
A number of factors can account for this lowering of credit standards, but most 
striking was the meteoric development of the securitization market.100 The use of 
securitization as a financing tool began in the 1970s, when lenders began to securitize 
mortgages.101 Over the years, securitization in general and securitization of mort-
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landsche Bank, Working Paper No. 114, 2006), available at http://www.dnb.nl/bina-
ries/Working%20Paper%20114-2006_tcm46-146771.pdf (exploring competition in the 
banking sector). 
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178 Journal of Legislation [Vol. 42:2 
gages in particular grew, to the point where most subprime mortgages were securit-
ized prior to the outbreak of the mortgage crisis.102 Securitization has thus become a 
central financial tool in the modern economy.103 It allows banks to take advantage of 
assets that produce predictable income, such as mortgages, to obtain interim financ-
ing for economic activities.104 To securitize mortgages, banks separate them from the 
rest of their assets, bundle them together, and sell them to a special purpose vehicle 
(SPV) that is created for the sole purpose of the securitization. The SPV finances the 
transaction by issuing securities backed by the securitized mortgages (mortgage-
backed securities).105 
The mortgage market is sub-divided into a primary and secondary markets. In 
the primary market, mortgage agreements are made between homebuyers and banks. 
Securitization then turns the illiquid mortgage loans that were created in the primary 
market into mortgage-backed securities that can be bought and sold in a secondary 
market. The banks that originated the loans backing the securities are not actually 
party to the trade between the investors in the secondary market. The secondary mort-
gage market enables the bypassing of the financial institution’s mediation process 
and the formation of a direct link between lenders and borrowers through daily trade 
on the stock exchange.106 
The main criticism of securitization is that it creates a disconnect between the 
banks and the mortgages they securitize, thereby lessening the ex-ante incentive for 
banks to ensure the quality of their mortgages.107 Banks can relax their criteria for 
mortgage loans, knowing that they will not bear the risks of the loan.108 Empirical 
findings have, in fact, revealed such a propensity on the part of lenders to securitize 
riskier loans, such as subprime or Alt-A mortgages. In 2006, 75% of subprime loans 
and 91% of Alt-A loans were securitized, compared to only 46% of jumbo loans, 
which are regular loans to prime borrowers.109 Another study found a rise in securit-
ization in areas with high levels of subprime loans.110 
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Because of the information gap between the banks that originate the mortgages 
and the investors in MBSs, banks can shift the risks in the loans to investors without 
that shift being completely reflected in the price. The difficulty in assessing the risk 
and pricing it accordingly can be attributed to financial engineering. When complex 
derivatives of MBSs are created, any connection to the risks inherent in the original 
housing loans becomes difficult to see.111 The inability of investors to evaluate the 
risks was a factor in the collapse of the MBS market in late 2007, which triggered the 
global financial crisis.112 
VI. THE MORTGAGE MELTDOWN 
Non-recourse loans allow borrowers to limit their liability in the event of default 
on their loan payments. A lack of a down payment requirement further reduces bor-
rowers’ loss in default. This Part now shows how the combination of these two fea-
tures of the US mortgage market contributed to the housing boom and bust in the 
2000s.113 
During the 2000s, the ability to obtain full financing for real estate purchases 
without bearing any personal liability incentivized potential homebuyers to take out 
loans to purchase houses they could not finance themselves and benefit from having 
a place to live. When housing prices rose, borrowers reaped the profits—profits that 
were not shared with lenders beyond the interest payments on the loans. If a borrower 
failed to realize the profits at the right time and the house subsequently decreased in 
value, she could walk away from her home; this forced the lender to foreclose, and 
the debt was terminated. As explained, with a non-recourse mortgage, the lender 
could not seek a deficiency judgment, leaving the borrower with no liability for the 
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balance of the loan. The availability of credit with little risk upfront (no down pay-
ment) or liability afterward (no recourse to non-collateralized assets) considerably 
increased the demand for real estate, which caused prices to skyrocket and created a 
real estate bubble.114 
The combination of non-recourse mortgages with the elimination of down pay-
ment requirements resulted in a distortion of the risk allocation in the mortgage mar-
ket.115 A moral hazard was created when borrowers were no longer subject to an ex-
ante requirement to invest personal equity or to ex-post personal liability for repay-
ment. They could now externalize the risk of default to third parties, such as investors 
in mortgage-backed securities and, more broadly, society at large.116 
Using the structure of the repayment schedule, lenders exploited borrowers’ cog-
nitive biases, such as myopia, to strengthen the incentive to take out a mortgage.117 
In many cases, the terms of the mortgage allowed for a significant grace period before 
the monthly repayments began. In other cases, lenders gave adjustable-rate mort-
gages (ARMs) with low starting interest rates,118 in line with the macroeconomic 
policy of the US Federal Reserve in the years leading up to the mortgage melt-
down.119 Myopic borrowers focus on the short-term benefits of the initial low pay-
ments and undervalue the long-term costs of the future high payments. Low starting 
interest rates lured borrowers in, raising the demand for these mortgages and bloating 
the housing finance market. The problems only arose at the end of the grace period 
or after the variable interest rate went up and borrowers had difficulty making their 
monthly payments.120 
As lenders began foreclosure proceedings on collateralized properties, many 
houses went up for sale in order to repay the debts of the borrowers.121 The massive 
wave of foreclosures led to a housing glut on the market and a resulting sharp drop 
in real estate prices.122 When housing prices fell, many borrowers whom had not been 
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required to make a down payment found themselves with significant negative equity 
in their properties.123 California, a non-recourse state, was notorious for its high rates 
of negative equity. The highest national negative equity rates were in three metropol-
itan areas of California: Merced, El Centro, and Modesto, with 85%, 85%, and 84% 
underwater mortgaged properties respectively.124 
Furthermore, their negative equity in their properties greatly reduced borrowers’ 
incentives to invest in maintaining the homes.125 Borrowers with significant negative 
equity understood that any investment in repairing or improving their homes would 
benefit only the lenders in foreclosure: although this would raise the property’s value, 
that value would go to the lender alone. Thus, a vicious cycle set in, where properties 
were neglected, their value dropped further, and the negative equity in the asset 
grew.126 
The sharp decline in housing prices led to an uptick in both the number of bor-
rowers with negative equity in their properties and the proportion of that negative 
equity. As a result, strategic default became a rational choice for an increasing num-
ber of borrowers.127 Even borrowers with the financial means to continue their mort-
gage payments often found it worthwhile to default.128 Foreclosure proceedings 
flooded the collapsing real estate market, triggering a further deterioration in housing 
prices. 
Thus, non-recourse mortgages with no requirements for down payments had a 
negative impact both ex ante and ex post. They created an incentive for borrowers to 
take out irresponsible loans that did not correlate with their ability to repay them. 
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These loans made the option of strategic default ex post more attractive to borrowers 
with negative equity in the property.129 
VII. NON-RECOURSE REGULATION IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE MELTDOWN 
The analysis above showed how non-recourse mortgages were a significant fac-
tor in the 2000s housing boom and bust. One would expect that the lessons of the 
mortgage crisis would have led state legislators to limit the scope of anti-deficiency 
laws. However, quite the opposite happened. Following the meltdown, the legisla-
tures in some of the leading foreclosure states, in fact, expanded the scope of manda-
tory non-recourse mortgage legislation. 
Nevada is an interesting example of a state that shifted from a recourse regime 
to a non-recourse regime following the mortgage crisis. In Nevada, a lender generally 
has the right to sue a borrower for a deficiency if the suit is brought within six months 
of the foreclosure sale.130 The borrower is entitled to a deficiency hearing, and the 
lender must give the borrower notice of the hearing at least fifteen days in advance.131 
After the hearing, the court determines the fair market value of the property at the 
time of the foreclosure sale and awards a deficiency judgment.132 The judgment must 
be for the lesser of the following two amounts: (a) the difference between the out-
standing debt and the fair market value of the property at the time of the foreclosure 
sale, or (b) the difference between the outstanding debt and the foreclosure sale 
price.133 
Following the mortgage meltdown, however, the Nevada state legislature 
amended its rule from recourse to non-recourse. Thus, for loans originating on or 
after October 1, 2009, Nevada law prohibits lenders from suing borrowers for a defi-
ciency after a foreclosure sale if all of the following five conditions are met: (1) the 
lender is a financial institution; (2) the property securing the mortgage is a single-
family dwelling owned by the borrower at the time of the foreclosure sale; (3) the 
property was the borrower’s primary residence continuously from the time the mort-
gage was executed; (4) the amount of the mortgage loan was used to purchase the 
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property; and (5) the borrower did not refinance the mortgage.134 Moreover, defi-
ciency judgments are prohibited after a short sale135 or deed in lieu of foreclosure136 
if all of the following six conditions are met: (1) the lender is a financial institution; 
(2) the property securing the mortgage is a single-family dwelling owned by the bor-
rower at the time of the sale in lieu of a foreclosure sale; (3) the property was the 
borrower’s primary residence continuously from the time the mortgage was executed; 
(4) the amount of the mortgage loan was used to purchase the property; (5) the agree-
ment between the borrower and the lender does not state the amount of money still 
owed to the lender by the borrower and does not authorize the lender to recover that 
amount from the borrower; and (6) the agreement contains a conspicuous statement 
that the lender has waived the right to seek a deficiency judgment.137 
California was considered a non-recourse state long before the mortgage melt-
down. A deficiency judgment following a nonjudicial foreclosure is not allowed in 
California.138 California adopted the “one-action” rule, which provides that after de-
fault on a mortgage, the lender’s sole remedy is a foreclosure action, and any claim 
for a deficiency must be sought by way of that proceeding.139 This means that the 
lender can opt to pursue a judicial foreclosure and then seek a deficiency judgment,140 
so long as the borrower is not protected by California’s anti-deficiency legislation, or 
else pursue a nonjudicial foreclosure and forego a deficiency judgment.141 Either one 
of these options, once completed, constitutes one action.142 In California, almost all 
residential foreclosures are nonjudicial, making deficiency judgments very uncom-
mon.143 A deficiency judgment is also prohibited in judicial foreclosure if the loan 
was for the purchase money for an owner-occupied dwelling that consists of one to 
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four units, or if the loan was financed by the seller.144 Moreover, a lender is not enti-
tled to a deficiency judgment following a short sale on a residential property that 
contains no more than four units.145 
Following the mortgage crisis, California expanded the protection to borrowers 
even further. In 2012, section 580b of the California Code of Civil Procedure was 
amended to extend purchase money anti-deficiency protection to homeowners who 
refinanced their home loans on or after January 1, 2013. The amended rule now pro-
tects homeowners who refinanced their original home mortgages from deficiency 
judgments after a judicial foreclosure, but only up to the principal amount of the 
original purchase loan that remains unpaid at the time of foreclosure.146 
Similar to regulators’ response to the housing crisis during the Great Depression, 
it seems that the regulatory reaction to the Great Recession has also been focused on 
relieving the dire situation of borrowers. Vast numbers of borrowers lost their homes 
in foreclosure proceedings that yielded a significantly lower return than the outstand-
ing balance of the debt; they were then exposed to the risk that lenders would sue 
them personally for the large deficiency. State regulators therefore moved swiftly to 
widen the scope of anti-deficiency protection to prevent lenders from continuing to 
pursue borrowers for the remainder of their debt after foreclosure. 
Addressing the predicament of borrowers in the aftermath of a crisis is, of course, 
vital and should be at the top of regulators’ agenda. Anti-deficiency laws are intended 
to alleviate the plight of borrowers who have lost their homes and protect them from 
deficiency judgments. The focus of this regulation is on the ex post borrowers’ bur-
den. However, regulators should not only engage in the ex post impact of the regula-
tory measures but also take into account the long-term ex-ante consequences. From 
an ex ante perspective, anti-deficiency laws create an incentive for excessive borrow-
ing. Non-recourse mortgages encourage borrowers to take out loans they may not be 
able to repay. As demonstrated in this article, non-recourse mortgage regulation cre-
ates a moral hazard problem and enables borrowers to externalize the risks of default 
to third parties. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
This article has analyzed the role played by non-recourse mortgages in creating 
the conditions that triggered the recent global financial crisis. The effect of non-re-
course mortgages, in conjunction with the elimination of down payment require-
ments, was a distortion of risk allocation in the US mortgage market. When borrow-
ers are not required to invest anything upfront in order to get a mortgage and bear no 
personal liability for repayment in the event of default, they are not deterred from 
taking out loans beyond their means. Quite the contrary: this only incentivized ex-
cessive borrowing, increased the demand for real estate assets, and led to the housing 
boom and bust. 
The analysis of the incentive distortions created by non-recourse mortgages has 
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important implications for the recent regulatory reforms in the US mortgage market. 
The borrower-friendly state legislation enacted in the wake of the mortgage melt-
down that expanded the scope of non-recourse mortgages failed to give proper weight 
to the negative long-term implications of this regulation, such as distorted incentives 
for excessive borrowing. Regulators should take heed of the insights from the analy-
sis here and beware of overestimating the short-term benefits of the regulation and of 
underestimating its long-term costs. 
From a broader perspective, the discussion in this article illustrates how regula-
tion that was enacted as a reaction to a severe economic crisis (the Great Depression) 
not only failed to prevent a large-scale future crisis (the Great Recession), but also 
laid the groundwork for the emergence of the latter. This represents a novel approach 
in the academic research on the causes of the recent global financial crisis, where the 
common assumption is that deregulation was to blame for the crisis. 
And yet despite the article’s criticism of the regulatory practices in the wake of 
economic crises, it does not object to regulation per se. At the base of the article is 
the premise that regulation is an important tool in modern economies. The intention 
here has been to point out the risks created by the atmosphere of public fear and 
distrust that follows a serious financial crisis, which can lead the regulatory authori-
ties to hurriedly push through regulation without sufficiently evaluating its potential 
impact. The approach advocated in this article is a forward-looking regulatory pro-
cess that takes into account the full range of possible outcomes of the regulation ra-
ther than the need for a quick regulatory response to appease public outrage. To be 
sure, the risk that regulatory intervention could cause serious damage in the future 
should not deter regulators from acting. A regulatory process that includes a thorough 
review and investigation of possible future impacts of the proposed measures should 
enable regulators to identify the built-in risks of the regulation and either neutralize 
them in advance or at least minimize their impact as much as possible. 
